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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
R. D.

TOBIN, ET AL.,

Respondents,
vs.

Case N·o. 6380

UNITED BoNn & FINANCE CoRPoRATION, a corporation, ET AL.,

AppeUants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
In 'their original brief the appellants presented c.ertain matters pertaining to the pleadings, the findings,
and the decree of the Trial ·Court, and well-e,sta blished
p·r.inciples of law in relation thereto, which were thought
to be fundamental. The respondents hav.e made little
or no effort to meet the a.rgum·ents therein presented,
but on the ·other hand have chosen to present their case
in ·a manner having but slight relation to the points assigned as error and argued by app·ellants, and for that
reas·on it becomes neces·sary f.or 'appellants to reply to
• 1
certain matters suggested and argued in respondents'
brief.
I
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In the first part of their brief respondents call the attention of the ·Court to certain st·a,tements of fa:ct which
they insist are ·controverted.
Directing the Court's .attention to these matters we
desire to point out ·that appellants have eontended from
the first, and do now contend, that it appears from the
pleadings, from the evidence, and from the decree of the
Court, that the only purpose of this action is to procure
the appointment of a receiver. Of course this matter is
controverted. If it is not, re.sponde:p.ts are out of court
without reme.dy as the authorities cited in our original
brief ~clearly shovv.
In answer to the ma'tter pertaining to reserve for
common stock, we :call the 1Court 's attention to the three
audits offered in ·evidence as a part of defendants' case,
namely, the audit made as of the close of busines·s D~e
c.ember 31, 193:5 by .Beesley and 1Wood, the audit made as
of the close of business De~c.emher 31, 1938, by IS. D.
Rasn1ussen and ·Company, and the audit made as of the
close of business December 31, 1939, by 'Beesley and
Wood. In each .of these audits the auditors under the
Liabilities column, and particularly under the Net \Vorth
Division thereof, have shown this reserve. Beckst·ead
testified that this reserve was set up and created as a
result of the sale of units of stock for more than
$12'5.00.
It is true that B.eckstead was a poor ·man when he
set ·out ·to organize the United Bond and Finance ·Corporation, and as far as that is concerned, he is still a poor
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1nan, as appears from the evidence produced by respondent over the objeetion of appellants. ~rhey, \vith
notieeable interest, proved his insolvency and ilnpecunio~ity at the trial, but neYertheless it \Yas thr·ough
Beckstead ~s efforts and the time and attention he devoted
to this eorporate enterprise that it \Yas able lo survive
and achieve the success \Yhieh is sho,vn and indicated by
the audits and finHncial staten1ents introduced as part
of the eYidenre. There is no evidence that Beckstead ever made $15,000.00 a year as a representative or employee ·Or officer of the United Bond and
Finance ·Corporation, and we call the •Court 's attention
to the testimony of Mr. Beckstead in support of this
assertion. There ea.n be no question but what B-Hckstead
has dra,vn a salary from the ·con1pany for his services
since December of 1931, but no finding was ever
made by the trial Court, (in fact no evidence
was offered on the I·ssue by the plaintiff), to
the effect that the salary drawn by Beckstead has
been exorbitant or unreasonable. It is asserted that
Beckstead did nnt invest the corporation's money in aceoroanee with the ·COrporate purposes, and that he did
not do all things necessary to keep the assets of the
company invested in interest bearing securities. The
corporate purposes ·are cle·arly set forth in the articles
of incorporation, and an examination thereof will show
that the investment of the assets of the corp·oration in apartment houses, first mortgages, real
estate contracts, ranches and livestock is specifically set
forth as being 'vi thin the corporate ,purposes. Aec:ording
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to Be·ckstead 's testimony, prior to the acquisition ·Of the
apartment houses the money and assets of the corporation vvere invested in mortgages and interest bearing
securities. No attempt was made· to disprove this evidence. It is asserted that the corporation abandoned its
corporate purposes and changed its business activities.
We cannot understand what is meant by ''abandoning
the eorporate purposes'' when the evidence clearly
sho"\V·S tha·t there has been no abandonment, and the corporation at all times bas engaged in business strictly
within the authorization of the articles of inc;o·rporation.
It is true that during the life of the corporation it has
engaged in various business activities, but all the activities engaged in were authorized by the ·articles. The
evidence clearly sho~~s that the depression did affect the
business and corpor·ate aff.airs ·Of the defendant corporation, and it is well known that practically every corporation was similarly effected by this condition.
With respect to the payment of dividends the unquestioned ·evidence of the defendant was sufficient to
show what has happened to the assets of the eorporation
sinc.e its organization, and the reas.ons why dividends
have not been paid.

This evidence discloses that the

income of the corporation has been used to reduce indebtedness and principal iba1ances due on obligations
secured by m·ortgage-s on corporate property, and for the
purpose of acquiring livestock and valuable ranch property in Wyoming. The .c·ourt made no finding whatsoever that dividends were vvrongfully withheld; or that
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there ''"as any misn1anagen1ent whatsoever by the failure
of the corporation to pay dividends. There wa.s no intimation in the pleadings nor during the trial, nor in the
findings of the C'ourt, that dividends paid by the corporation prior to July, 1931, W·ere in ~any way wrongfully
paid -or taken from the -capital .of the corporation. We
also call the ·attention of the Court to the fa!c.t that no
accounting or audit was ordered to determin·e whether
or not these dividends represented actual earnings or
whether they were "sucker bait" ·Or "come-on'' dividends. No stockholder has ever complained because of
the payment of these dividends, and no a.ttempt was
made to go into this question during the trial of this case.
It seems that counsel's "after thoughts,.' will never cease
until this cas.e is finally and completely determi~ed.
Appellants submit that the evidence shows that
the stockholders of the United Bond and Finance
Corporation did sell and trade their stock to stockholders
and stockbrokers, and that these stoektraders and brokers
we;re not agents or employees ·Of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation.
The articles of in-corporation of t~he United B.on'd and
Finance Corp·oration permit the investment .of assets of

the corporation in its own sto-ck. It is well known that
this pr·actice was followed by many corporations, not only
in Utah, but generally, as appears from the testimony of Wood and Beckstead. The preferred stock
certificates provide for their retirement, and to
assume th·at these provisions were made with evil intent
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is to make a presumption that is not justified hy the eviden·ce nor by any .p·roof offered by either party to this
lawsuit. Respondents make no reference whatsoever to
any part of the record to support th-e assertion that
Beckstead had in mind any unl(awful or evil intent with
respect to the repurchase of its own stock by the corporation at the time it was organized or at any time
t·hereafter. From 1927-1~931 the assets of the corporation, as a.ppe•ars fr.om Beckstead's testimony, were invested in mortgages and .other interest hearing securities,
and thus an immediate return .on investments was procured.
It is asserted that the depression simply furnished
Beckstead with an ·excuse and with an alibi for dis·continuing the paying of the so-called dividends. The
many assumptions which would be necessary to
support this pr·oposition are rather st·artling. It is well
known that the depression resulted in the inability of
people generally to pay interest or to make payments ·
on principal.· It is well known that this general condition of distress made necess~ary the organization ·Of the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation and other relief
agencies to p·rotect home owner.s from £oreclosure, and
of necessi~ty companies doing the business that the finance
company was doing were among the first to suffer a loss
of income.
It was not Be·ckstead who disheartened ·and discouraged the stockhold·ers, ·but the depres•sion itself, and the
stockholders of the United Bond an·d Finan·ee Corpora-
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tion "·ere no different from stockholders in other corporations doing· busines-s in the United States at that
time. The Court, \Ye think, should take judicial kno,v-1edge of the £act that the value of stocks of ~all kind declined sharply during this .period, and that stocktraders
and stockbrokers did engage in stock trading schen1es
throughout the country.
An intimation is contained in the third paragraph
appearing -on page ( 5) of the brief that the stocktraders
and stockbrokers \Yho \Yere engaged in these practices in
lTtah ~nd ·surrounding states were all agents, representatives and ·employees of the United Bond and Finance
Corporation. De:fini te evidence ''Tas in troduceq by the
plaintiffs through the \Yitness Mads~en, to the effect that
at the time he \vas \vorking with P,andolf.o they vvere
trading Tri-hase oil certificates for stock of every and
any kind. l\iadsen stated that during the time he worked""
for Pandolfo he could not remember of having purchased
any units of United B·ond and Finance Corporation stock.
No attempt \Vas made by plaintiffs to refute the testimony of Beckstead that none· of the stockbrokers from
whom 90lfo ·of the stock was purchased had ~any connection whats.oever with United Bond and Finance ,Corporati·on or Beckstead personally, and evidently the stock
which is the subject of respondents lament all came into
the hands of these brokers before it was acquired by the
eorpora tion.
In the last paragraph on page ( 5) respondents speak
of the danger to Beckstead of dealing op~nly and directly
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with such stock pickers as Egbert Pandolfo, Art Madsen, Paradis and· a long list of others.
In the first pla.ee, the evidence clearly shows that
Beckstead did deal openly with Pandolfo and purchased
either from Pandolfo or from his wife, or from Roe
l{elley, who represented Pandolfo, some $5,000.00 worth
of stock. There is no evidence in the record that Beckstead· ha'd ~any other connection with Pandolfo whats.oever. Although Pandolfo was named a.s one of the defendants, ~and various charges were made in the com.plaint to the effect that P'andolfo ~and Beckstead worked
hand in hand together, there was not .one word of evidence to estaiblish this proposition, and no finding was
made by the Court .supporting such allegations.
·With respect to Madsen, ther·e w•as no evid,ence whatsoever connecting him in any way with ·either Be0kstead
or the United B·ond and Finance Corporation, and as
far as Paradis is concerned, his conne·ction ceased either
in the latter part of 1931 or the e•arly part -of 1932 .
. We shall diseuss the connection of the defendant with
0. P. Pearce in the portion of this brief under the subje-ct ''Suits Pending.''
In the second paragraph on page (6), respondents
say:
'''Beckstead would then m.ake his d·ea.l for this
'hot ·st-ock' directly with the stockbroker and by
this method was able to divoree himself from offi:cial and .first hand knowledge of the wholes~ale
· ·swindles which were ·being perpetrated up·on his
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stockholders, 'vhereby they 'vere traded out o£
their holdings in his eorporation. ''
We are at a loss to know exa.ctl~,. what respondents
mean by the term '·'hot''. \\:'"e know of no provision of
law that ·renders corporate stock either contra·band or
an unlawful ·article of commerce merely be\cause the
stockhold'er has traded, sold or given it to someone.
Counsel refers to ~ '1vholesale swindles''. Another instance of a resort to accusation, unsupported by p-roof.
Another instance of what Counsel hoped to prove but
couldn't. Not one of the former stockholders from
~fontana ra1ne before th·e C:ourt protesting the transfe-r
and sHle of their stock. The only stockholders who have
made complaint were the stockholders within the State
of Utah who were ·contacted by 0~ P. Pearce, and as to
these ·stockholders and these transactions we shall make
appropriate con1ment later on.
Counsel, after making the statements referred to,
is then satisfied "rith saying:
''Thus it is clear that the trading in stock
ca.me not as a result of the depres.sion, but fr.om
a deliberate .planned S'C:h·eme _to convert all the
corporation's assets to the individual use and
profit of Beckstead.''
Respondent does not refer to testim·ony in the record
supporting this statement. There is no justiHcation for
this statement in the record. The C'Ourt made no finding
which would supp·ort it, ~and again we -call the Court's attention to the fact that the respondents proved the
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~mpe~uniosi ty

and insolvency of B·eckstead, and we suggest that if he has been engaged for twelve or fourteen
years in ·carrying out a s-cheme and plan to steal and
convert the assets and stock of the corporation to his
O'\Vn use, his efforts to the present time at least have
been entirely fruitless.
Fron1 Exhibit 15, at page ( 4) it appears that 1804
shares of preferred stock, par value $100.00 a share •and
2244 ·Shares of comn1on sto!(:k ·Of no par value have been
repurchased by the corporation.
In paragraph (8) at the bottom of page (6), Respondents' Brief, it is st·ated that the stockholders sold
this stock due to the systematic and habitual evil practices of B·eckstead, ·and due to the false and fraudulent
representations made to his stockholders.
The only evidence in the record which renders any
support to this statement whatsoever is the testimony
of the witness, 0. P. Pearce. It is •admitted that late
in 1935 and near the end .of the period during which the
corporation purchased any of its ·own stock P·earce cont,acted a limited nu1nber of people .and made certain representations. Later on in this brief we shall comment
on thes·e transactions. With this exception there is no
evidence in the record whatsoever to support this proposition. The record clearly sho,v.s that the vast ·majority
of t'he stock purchased \Va·s purchased from stockbrokers.
H·ow they procured the stock, where, or under what ·circuinstances, does not appear. The only thing that does
appear is that these stockbrokers had no connection what-
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soever \Yith either Beckstead or the United Bond and
Fina.n·ce Corporation.
In connection \Yith the ''ryoming ranches mentioned
on page (7) -of respondents' brief, appears a most interesting statement :
''Had Beckstead died in the meantime the
ranches most cert~ainly would have been a part
of his estate and title thereto would have passed
to the heirs.''
We are rather interested in just what eounsel 's con~eption

of the la-\v in regard to matters ·of that kind can

be. The evidence is ·clear, convincing and uncontradicted
that Beckstead and his wife immediately after the property 'vas acquired, by good and sufficient \Varranty deed,
conveyed it to the United Bond and Finance

Corpo~ation.

The United .Bond and Finance Corporation owned the
property.

T·he audits of the <Corporation showed it.

Financial statements to stockholders sho"'. . ed it, and certainly if Beckstead had died, the United Bond and Finanee Corpof!ation would have had all its property, and
the mere fact that the .deed was unrecorded would have
made no difference whats-oever in this situation. We
had thought that the findings of the Court would have
forever quieted counsels' harping about the transfer
of the Wyoming ranches to Beckstead. The Court did
not and would not find that Beckstead ever converted
or n1isappropriated or ev-er intended to convert or misappropriate any of this Wyoming property to his own
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use or .to the use ·of any other person, not the owner
t~ereof. It is stated that:
"The title remained in Beckstead's name individ'IJ,,ally for about three years."
The statement is not only fals·e and positively untrue, but its untruth appears from the evidence in this
case.
The latter paragraph on page (7) contains another
accusati·on to the effect that -Beckstead transferred this
property to its rightful owner, the United B·ond and
Finance Corporation, only after ''heat was applied.''
We ask, what beat, and by whom, and where is there

any .evidence in the rec·ord to support ·Such a. ridiculous
accusation~

All the facts with re.spect to the organization of the
Beckstead Livestock Company, and the acquirement by
it and the United Bond and Finance Corporation of
property in Wyoming are hefore the Court and have
been commented on at length in our previous briefs.
Suffice it to say the evidence conclusively shows that the
affairs of the Beckstead Livestock C·ompany have been
handl·ed in an honest, uprigh_t and lawful manner.
Answering paragraph (10) on page (8) of respondents' brief, it was definit·ely testified fhat the mortgage
indebtedness on the Wyoming ranches was less than
$14,000.00. T·he statement that the affairs of the Live-
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st.ock Conlpany and Finance Corporation are interwoven
and intermingled will be answered hereafter.
Counsel states that:
~'N.o

one can tell whether the United Bond and
Finance Corporati<>n is solvent or not.''
\Y. e are wondering whether or not respondents are:
~nggesting

that the Court guess about this situation. The:
evidence is that the corporation is solvent and there is
no evidence to the contrary. The ·certified publi~c aceountant, Mr. \Vood, testified that it was solvent from
the standpoint that its .assets ex·ceeded its liabilities, and
als-o fr·om the standpoint that it was in such financial
condition as would :permit it to pay its current liabilities
on time, as well as ·any payments on long term mortgages
and contracts. To say nothing a~bout the bur;den of proof,
if this matter still be at is.sue. It is also stated t'h.at:
''The books and records of the corporation
are in the posse-ssion of B-eckstead.''
In whose possession should they be, may we ask~
Beekstead is the President and General Manager of the
company, and certainly is by la"v charged with the eustody ·of thes·e records and with their protection.
It is also stated that:
Some of the record.s of the ·corp·oration are
missing and hav·e been destroyed.''
1
' '

The only missing records which we know of are the
records in possession -of the respondents which pertain
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. to the affairs of the· Inve·stors Thrift. How -or in what
manner, or under w.hat circumstanc-es respondents became possessed of these re·cords does not a.pp.e.ar.
; It is also .stated that:
'''The only a·ccess plaintiffs have had to the
books .and re-cords is when a. part ·Or portion there. ·· of was produced in Court during the trial.''
We now ask the responde~n:ts if they desire access to
the. fHC.Ords ~ c·ertainly they have never been refused
such access. All records they requested were produced
in Court, and every ·opportunity to examine them was
afforded.
FACTS

""Wny counsel -calls this subdivisi·on of the brief ''the
facts'' is not apparent after comparing the statements
made with the reeord. H·e starts out hy what is to us
rather .an immaterial missta.ten1ent, but he says that
Green is a brother-in-lavv of Beckstead and Bradsha-\v.
This is not true, either in the record or as a matter of
fact.
The next paragraph in this se-ction relates to the
use by the ·corporation .of the words "United States,"
and reference is made to it a.s fraudulent in design and
constituting spurious advertising, and in violation of
Federal laws.
This is another '' typi·c:al case'' .of counsel bringing
in n1atters which are entirely immaterial and outside of
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we

the issues. For the first time
hear that he relies
upon this fart as justifying· lsQmething-apparently receiYersbip.
Counsel evidently droes not think he is bound by
either the pleading-s ·or the findings of the Court. Thi~s
is typical throughout his statement of ''the ~acts.''
·Counsel apparently ·gets some comfort in making·
out his case that the United Bond and Finance Corporation \Yas started ·out upon ''the proverbial shoe string.''
The most interesting of success stories abound with
other similar instances and furthermore initial ·corporate
poverty is not a ground for receivers·hip. The fact that
the eoi:npany was started on a shoe string is no evidence
of any fraudulent intent, and ·cannot supp·ort plaintiffs'
case either as to the accounting or as to grounds for
receivership. The Court made no ·finding upon this p-roposition. Tlie plaintiff as a matter of pleadings did not
rely upon it, so we :submit that it is entirely immaterial
to any of the issues of this case.
Counsel says that the note given by Beckstead for
the shares of preferred stock originally· issued to him
was never paid. As pointed -out in appellants' brief, the
Court g,o found. We think W'e have conclu.sively sh-own
that the evidence does not support that finding. Counsel refers to a number ·of pages in the transcript as
justifying this finding.
We submit that the evidence set forth on pages
1663 and 1715 of the transcript -clearly indi•ca.tes that
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the note was paid; that is, the ·Corpor·ation. received
money fro-m the .sale of these shares of stock sufficient
to wipe out the note.
Complaint is made that the stockh-olders supplied
all the capital. w.e do not believe this fact is any
grounds £or a receivership or for an aecounting. Stockho-lders are usually the one~s who put up the .capital of
the corporation. It is not contended that there wa.s any
fraud in the sale of the stock to stockholders. They knew
what they were getting. The certificates which they
purchased indicated what they vvere getting. Those who
put in ·capital and received certificates which did not
·entitle them to vote knew what they were getting. They
were \Yi1ling to invest their money in this typ·e of .corporation as :an investment. It may be that they did not
realize from their investment what they had anticipated
they would, but during the years from 19'31 until almost
the present time, what :Corporation has paid what the
stockholders believed they \vould o'btain when they invested their money during the boom years of 1927-19~31.
Under this subdivision of respondents' brief, they
state that the corporation was organized under the laws
of the State of Utah, yet it did not comply ·with the Utah
Securities Act, nor did it apply for a license to sell its
stock in Utah.
Why has counsel placed this statement in his brief~
It is not alleged in the complaint; it is not found by the
Court; it does not tend in any way to support any finding of the Court. No proof was introduced on this matter
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at the trial. Here again is an after thought of counsel,
seeking to grab at straws to justify his position.
BECKSTEAD

HAs

ABsoLUTE ·CoNTROL OF ·CoRPORATION

Beckstead \Yas one -of the original organizers of the
company, :and the only original organizer \Yho has stayed
on "~th the con1p~any. Since the time the other organizers
left the con1pany he has controlled it. That he does, is
neither grounds for a reeeivership nor an a:ecounting.
It is like\Yise a. 'vell kno"rn fa·c.t that practically all~c.orpo
rations are controlled during their ·entire lif.e by the same
stockholder or san1e g·roup of stockholders.
,, '·Coi\IE-ON DIVIDENDS''

From 1927 to 1931 the corporation was selling its
stock in several states. Things looked good f.or a business of this type. Stockholders, of course, who were
buying on installm:ent contracts were encouraged to pay
up the contracts in order that they .could obtain the dividends "\Yhich the .corporation was paying. It is stated
that no dividends except a very small one have heen paid
since July, 1931.
It IS infered from this that
sometbing was wrong with the payment of dividends
between 192.7-19'31, and that the failure to pay since that
time has been for the purpose of discouraging stockholders and making them desire to get rid of their stock.
No evi,dence of this is in the re-cord. The fact is that a
depression stopped the sales of stock of the Finance
Corporation, and that same depression created a condi-
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tion wherein payment of intere.st and principal on mortgages. were not being made by house ho1ders. Counsel
entirely overlook~ or refuses to .SHe this .situation. In
any event no reliance was ba.sed upon the payment of
dividends or th~ failure to p:ay dividends so far as the
~complaint is concerned, and no finding was made upon
this subject.
TRADING INVESTORS OuT OF THEIR STocK

Here counsel refers to diver.s methods, devices,
agencies, instrumen;talities and corporations used lhy
Beckstead to trade finance corporation stockholders out
of their stock. He states that experience~ se,curities
salesmen, traders and stock pickers were .contaeted, and
that sucker li.sts of the finance ·corporation stockholders
. were. furnished to these ''pickers.''
'

.

The only. persons B·eckstead -contacted in connection
.with obtaining corp-orate stock so far as the evidence is
·COncerned were Arthur J. Smith, Frank c·. Rich and
'0. P. p:earce. Rich and Smith were given one list of
Finance Corporation stoekholders. · At trans~cript, page
536, Rich testified that he made copies of this list. So
all of these ''sucker lists'' referred to by respondents
narrows do\Yll to one list given to Rich and Sn1ith, and
then to follo"\v this to its conclusion, one unit of stock in
the United B·ond and Finance Corporation was obtained
by these two ''experienced pickers.''
: Another interesting thing is that Rich, Smith and
Pearce \Yere not engaged until October, 1935. By that
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titne almost a.ll the stock pur·chased by the e.orporation
had been pur-chased. The stock picked up since that
tin1e amounts to very little. The stock ol)tained by Pearce
"Tas almost entirelv stock in the .Investors T.hrift a~d ~ot
the United Bond ~nd Finance Corporation. · The fact of
the matter i~, as sho"'n ·by the testimony Pearce obtained
Finance Corporation stoek from three individuals only,
Mr. and Mrs. '''ils-on of Park City, Raymond Hofman of
Randolph and Dr. Petty of Cedar City.
Counsel then refers to various kinds of papers which
'vere used in making these trades. He refers to whiskey
warehouse receipts.

Not one unit of stock in the Fin-

ance Corp·oration was ever obtained in. ex·change for
whiskey warehouse receipts, in fact it appears that the
Finance Corporation never at any time owne·d or possessed such .as receipt. He then refers to participating
certificates in oil companies.

Not one share or unit of

stock in the Finance Corporation was. obtained hy it in
exchange for any such certificates.

There is no proof

that the corporation ever owned, possessed or

ex~hanged

any sueh interest. Interest in oil lease royalties is then
referred to, but no stock .ot the Finance C·o'rporation was
obtained from .stockholders by the us·e of any such interests. True it is that Mads-en obtained stock
from P-ogliano by the exchange of ·some such interest,
but his own testimony is that he was working in his O\Vll
behalf .at that time and certainly the ·evidence will not
support a statement that these intere.sts 'vere used by
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B·eckstead or any agent or representative of the Finance
Corporation.
Stoek of Investors Thrift is referred to, but it should
he noticed that this stock was not used for e:x!change purposes after the month of June, 193'2-more than eight
years before the bringing of this action.
'0. P. Pearce used stock of the American Keene
Plaster .and Cemerit Company in obtaining certificates of
stock in the Finance C'orpora.tion from the Wilsons, Raymond Hofman and Dr. Petty. These matters will be
com1nented upon at length hereinafter.
All the way thr.oug'h the brief respondents continu- ·
ously r·efer to the stock of the American Keene Plaster
and Cement Company as ·being worthless, intimating that
neither the stock nor the company has any value whatsoever.

Evidently respondents rely upon the testimony

of Ezra Gull, Dr. Petty and Raymond H.ofman to support this proposition. The witness Gull admitted that
he had no knowledge \Vhatsoever as to the value of the
a:s~sets of the American Keene Plaster and Cement c·ompany, nor \Yith respect to its business. He based his
testimony that the stock had no 1narket value upon investigations he had made from stockholder·s and others
who informed him that there was no stock for sale at
any price on the market, and that they knew of no demand for any such stock. The evidence "\Vas that the
stock of this -corporation has never been on the market
and that no market value was ever e-stablished for· it.
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The evidence of Crandall 1s to the effect that the
corporation is actively engag-ed in business, has eonsiderable property,- including- a plant, land, leases, mineral
rights, trucks and equip1nent, and that f.or the year 1939,
it paid a F'ederal inco1ue tax.
Complaint is 1nade to the effe·ct that the corporation
purchased its O\Yn bonds from investors for sixty cents
on the dollar.
,,~e

are ''ondering just ,,. .hat form of mismanage-

ment such practice involves.

If Beckstead, as manager

of the corporation,. had not pur·chased such bonds at that
price " . .hen offered to him, he vvould have been imp.roperly
per£orming his duties as manager. The irony of
the situation is further n1ade manifest when ·it ·appears that the plaintiffs who were the benefieiaries
of these transactions have shown no disposition to reject
the benefits derived therefrom. To the question: ''Why
should an investor holding an obligation of a solvent
-corporation accept sixty ·cents on a dollar in payment
of such bonds, we frankly say, we do not know and
besides what difference does it make. What we do say,
is that any such investor holding a valid obligation o.f
the defendant corporation can procure one hundred
cents on a dollar upon such obligations.
The attention of the Court is esp_ecially directed to
the last paragraph, page. 23, o.f respondents' brief. It
appears therefrom that the stock liability of the co;rpora.tion in the amount of $203,087.11 was retired and dis-
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charged: ·by tlie expenditure of $85,158.54 of corporate
fund.~, representing a gain -to the corporation of $117, ..
928.57. :1\$ pointed out in. our former hri~.f we yet are
not advise~ as to the attitude of the respondents on these
transaetions. Again w·e say, do they expect to retain
the benefits or reject them~ If they intend to reject
them, we would like to be advised a.s to how this is to
he a!ecomplished, and. in what manner a. receiver would
proceed to accomplish this rejection. On the other hand,
a receiver .can be of no aid to the plaintiffs in retainingthe benefits of these transactions. If they are to be
retained no question should he raised concerning them
here .. From all that appears in this record the Montana
·sto.ckholders who sold and disposed of their stock are
entirely satisfied with the transaction. The brokers ·evidently are sa.tisfied because no complaint has been made
by any of them.
PoGLIANO

Is

DEFRAUDED

O·uT OF Hrs SToCK

Out of what stoek and by whom' The pathetic story
of the defrauding of Pogliano set forth on page (24) of
respondents' brief is worthy of note.
It is true Art Madsen traded interests in oil land
to Pogliano £or; his stock . It. is also true that Madsen
had no connection whatsoever with the United
Bond and Finance Corporation.
P·ogliano indorsed
his stock in 'blank and · delivered it to Madsen
and Madsen sold and delivered the stock to a third
party, Jaek Oldroyd. The United Bond and Finance
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Corporation had n.othing to do with these transactions, and before its attention was called to any matter
that ".,.ould indicate dissatisfaction on the part of Pogliano, the defrauding· of Pogliano, if he

\Yas

defrauded,

had already been accomplished and the stock had foun?
its way into the hands of an innocent third party. Be~k~
stead

"~as

faced ''Tith a matter demanding decision .. 01;1

his part. The secretary and treasurer .of the corporation had taken the sto~.k from Oldroyd and had given him
a receipt for it "~thout consulting B·eckstead. Oldroyd·
demanded a transfer of the stock. .Beckstead decl~ned
to make the transfer and Oldroyd threatened suit for:
conversion. Be.ckstead decided that for the safety o.f the.
corporation the best thing that he could do was buy the
stock, and this he did. Even though it is taken as established that Pogliano was defra.u.ded out of his stock, still
the record sho\YS that the officers of the United Bond
and Finance Corporation were in no way conne-cted \vith
this transaction and \vere in no way guilty of any fraud
as far as Pogliano was .concerned, and, by the way, this
Pogliano transa-ction in the fall of 1939 \Vas the last· in-·
stance involving a purchase of its own stock by the 'finance corporation. The statement that,· ''hut. f·o,r ;this
litigation'' Beckstead would still be pickin·g up ·stock,
is nothing but a mere assumption on the part of the
writer of the brief, is not supported by any ·evidence, but
is contrary thereto, tihe evidence being that the repur.chase of stock by', the corporation for all practical ,purposes ended in July, 1936.
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H. ·0. L.

·C. LoANs oN CoRPORATION's PROPERTY

The first paragraph under this title leaves us in a
state of amazement.
Respondents sta,te that to obtain funds with which to
buy up the corporation'.s own stock, Mr. Beckstead borrowed money on property -of the United Bond and Finance Corporation from the Home Owners' L~oa.n C·orporation.
We were of the impression that everyone knew that
the H:ome Owners' Loan Corporation eould not and
'vould not loan money to a corporation, and the evidence
clearly .shows that the corporation never borrowed any
money or funds whatsoever from the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation. The company did hold mortgages on
home's as mortg·agee, and the mortgagors, after application n1ade to the Home Owne~s' Loan Corporation, obtained loans and the Finance Corporation was paid off in
hond·s of the H-ome Owners' Loan Corporation. The
evidence is that some of thes.e bonds thus obtained were
used by the Finance Corporation in the purchas·e of its
own stook, but to say that these funds -were obtained for
that purpose is not only inaccura·te but is contrary to
the evidence.
'''LITTLE PoucH''

Intimations are contained in the statements made
under this title that the whole scheme of purchasing this
stock was to provide a method whereby Beckstead could
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steal, embezzle and \Yrongfully convert the s:tock so acquired to his O\\~n use. If it is as~sumed without p.roof
that these \Yere his intentions then it n1ay be that some
of the suggestions made under this title are pertinent.
If, however, it is assumed until the contrary is proved,
at least by ~some evidence that he "\Vas acting as any other
honest manag-ing officer would have acted under ~imilar
circumstances, then there is nothing unusual or irre·gular
or unlawful in the manner in which this sto~ck was
handled.
The attention of the C·ourt is invited to the comments
on these matters contained in the three audits, to which
reference has heretofore been n1ade.

It appears from

the audit n1a.de by Beesley and V\r ood for the year 19"35
that prior to 1935 stock repur.chased -vvas immediately
cancelled and retired.

This practice brought up the

question as to \Yhether or not the gains resulting therefrom were income, and taxable as such. It was upon
the advice -of the a.udi tors that the stock purchased thereafter ,,~as held, and later regularly transferred to
the ·corporation, and this in January of 1940, long before
the ·eommencement .of thi~s suit.
The follo,ving statement appears on page (26) of
the brief:
"The stock '"\vas just held' (Tr. 838) in 'a
little pouch' .and permitted to 'accumulate' (Tr.
910) until litigation. arose, 'vhen transfer eerti·cate No. 872, da:ted J·anua.ry 10, 19·40, f.or five
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ulated' stock was issued to United Bond and Finance ·Cnrporation (Tr. 857).''
We· are at a loss to kno\v in what \vay .counsel can
justify· ,such a ·statement. The rec-ords show that litig-ation involving these matters did not arise until March
G, 1940 \Vhen the Court \vithout notice to the appellants
and in an ex-parte hearing, appointed an ancillary re~c.eiver, the order appointing such receiver being soon
thereafter properly vacated.
The Court is invited by respondents to become the
ac·cusers of the officers of this corporation without any
evidence· or findings to support such aocusation. \Ve
refer to staten1ents made at the bottom of page 25:
''How ~simple to write in the name of a. transferee of the stock certificates~
''How eonvenient to have ail the certificates
together in 'a little pouch'~''
W·e .c.ould go on and say how simple it is to commit
any kind or manner of crin1e; how simple it is to do
any one of a great number of things fro,Yned upon by
the la\v of the land and public opinion if one he so inclined. The mere fact that the

a!(~complishn1ent

of thes·e

acts is..simple does not Inean that they will probably
be aceomplished. The simplicity .of accomplishment is
not proof of intent. The .faet is, all of the stock of the
corporation was safely kept and none appropriated. The
testimony is uncontradicted, that for many years the
opportunity has continuously existed for Beckstead to
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do the things which it is intimated be intended to do, but

he ha.s never ·carried into execution, any of . these evil
intentions.

What better proof is there of his honesty

and .freedom from eYil intention v!
Complete and accurate records were at all times kept
of the stork obtained by the corporation. It is an ·odd
thing that such accurate records \Yould be kept if Beckstead intended to appropriate any of this stock to his own
use. It may be pertinent to observe that throughout the
conduct of these proceedings, in their complaint, in
their arguments to the Court, and in all the briefs
written, the respondents have made these various charges
.and accusations against Beckstead, but singulai'"ly they
'
haYe been unable to prove any of them. They have
proved that all of the property of the corporation is now
safely in its possession and under its. control. They
have proved that Beckstead is impecunious. They did
not produce any evidence upon which the trial · Court
was willing to find that there had been any misappropriation or fraudulent or unlawful diversion of -corporate
assets by Beckstead. Nevertheless, without evidence
and without proof, but merely because conditions existed
which made it possible to steal, take and embezzle the
property of the corporation, respondents conclude and
argue that Beck!stead from the outset has actually intended to wrongfully and unlawfully convert this property.
Re.spondents' strongest evidence in support ;c)t their
ac-cusation that Beckstead intended
steal the stock was

to
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in the testimony of Gull set forth on pages 26 and 27 of
the brief. According to that testimony B·eckstead admitted to Gull that the company had possession of the
stock ·certificates indorsed in blank, and that upon advice
from the auditors they were being so held by the corporation, until an appropriate time when the cancell~tions
w.ould be regularly and properly made.
In ans\ver to the clis.c.ussion under the title "Investors Thrift c·orporation'' we respectfully refer the Court
to our discussion of this n1a tter at pages 149-152 of our
original brief.
AMERICAN KEENE CEMENT

&

PLASTER CoMPANY

JoNEs INvESTMENT CoMPANY

Two n1atters only are worthy of notice in reply to
the argument under this title. The American Keene
Cement & Plaster Company is a Utah Corpo:ration in
good standing, presently engaged in business, and owning substantial assets, and is being operated at a priofit.
It.s ·stock has never been on the market, and the corporation was not financed through a stock selling promotion scheme.
With reference to the five thousand shares of stock
issued by the corporation to Beckstead, it definitely
appears from the evidence that the United Bond and
Fin~nce Corporation received whatever value there was
in this stock, and that it was all used to p·romote the
welfare and best interest ~of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation, and w·as not .sold or disposed of
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by Beckstead for his own personal gain even though

it "·as transferred to him personally.
..A.sHTox-JENKINs CoMPANY AND
....\sHTox-JENKINs INSURANCE CoMPANY

In our original brief \Ve have discussed rather fully
our Yie,Ys of the matters suggested by the above heading, and 'Ye respectfully refer the Court to the discussion
found at pages 33-44 in our original brief.
.A..t page 33 respondents state :
"\\~ith assets of l--:-nited Bond, including a
ranch near Ogden valued at $20,000.00 (Tr. 1345),
1Ir. Beckstead traded for the controlling stock of
Eddie Jenkins in the Ashton-Jenkins Company.''

Counsel knows, and the record cited in our brief
conclusively reveals that the only assets of the eorporation traded to

~fr.

Jenkins was the ranch at Ogden.

To intimate that other property was used "does violence
to the facts and truth in this case.''
At the top of page 35 it is stated:
''But a 0opy of this agreement, attached as
Exhibit A to the complaint in c·ase No. 51249
supra, shows that the agreement was with Wesley
R. B~eckstead, individually, and not with the
United Bond and Finan-ce or Investors Thrift
Corporation ( Tr. 1364-1366). ''
If counsel is interested in the Court being fully
advised a.s to the facts. surrounding this transaction, why
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does he not continue the statement and say that on the
day the contra~t was made with Beckstead it was fully
and completely assigned by him to the Investors Thrift
Corporation.

The same statement may also be made

\vith re.spect to the assignment of claims made to Mr.
Beckstead mentioned on page 35 of the brief.
Exhibit V-4 and W-4 set forth the complete transaction involving the purchase ,of the Ashton-Jenkins Insurance Company. Counsel states that the original agreement was lost, but that a oopy was produced. 1Ve ask
the Court to examine Exhibit V-4 and W-4. It is apparent that they are the original agreements in this transaction and are not copies thereof. On the back of the
agreement, V-4, and the back of the assignment, W-4,
appears an assignment by Wesley R. Beckstead assigning and conveying t.o t_he Investors Thrift Corporation
all his right, ti tie and interest in and to the agreement
and assignment. On the receipt contained in Exhibit
V-4, which is signed by the Ashton-Jenkins Insurance
Company, and others, it appears that the check given
for the purchase price of the insurance business was a
eheck of the United Bond and Finance Corporation. If
Beckstead was intending· to use money for his o\vn perStonal benefit and appropriate it to his own use, why
would such a complete record be made of this transaction showing the connection of the .companies represented by Th1r. Beckstead to this business transaction.
This matter is of no great importance to the Court
herein. As we pointed ~out in our original brief these
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Inatters were all terminated approximately t~n years
prior to the bringing· of this snit.
e bring then1 to the
Court's attention merely to show that here, as in othe·r
parts of the brief, an a tten1pt is being made· to influence
·the Court by presenting a part of a transaction only.

'T

,,~ YO~IIXG RANCHES AND INVESTMENTS.

In appellants' original brief matters pertaining to
the investment in the ,,. .yoming ranches and lives.tock
were discussed fully, and the attention of the Court
\Yas called to pertinent evidence appearing in the record
in regard to these transaction·s.

There are a. few mat-

ters, however that we feel should be mentioned herein.
Respondents' claim tha:t Beckstead purchased these
ranches as a part of a scheme to defraud the United
Bond ·and Finance Corporation out of its property, and
that he has attemptHd from the first to wrongfully divert
and misappropriate to his own use and benefit the property and funds of the United Bond and Finance Corpoteration by this device. The witness, George W. Smith's
testimony lends some support to the ·Claim. He was the
ancillary receiver of this 'iVyoming property appointed
exparte and without notice by the District Court of
Uinta County, Wyoming, in ~!arch, 19·40. His interest
was apparent throughout. App·ellants submit. that this
witness is not worthy of belief. Certainly the intimation
as to Beckstead's intenti~ons have been completely disproved.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

The own~r~hip of this property by the United Bond
and Finance Corporation has always been recognized
by Beckstead. It was up to the managing officers to
deter1nine whether. or not they would qualify the United
Bond and Finance Corp·oration to do business in Wyoming, or whether they should organize a Livestock Corporation in Wyoming for that purpose. They decided
to ·adopt the latt~r ·course, but there never has been an
instant when the property rights of the United Bond
and Fin~nce C·orporation have not been fully and adequately protected.
·Counsel can talk about the ''unrecorded deed" to
his heart's content, but he cannot show that either the
'corporation or these plaintiffs have ever suffered any
loss as a result of the.se transactions or that any of
their property rights have ever been endangered thereby.
It is stated that numerous stockholders of the United
Bond and Finance Corporation called on Ezra Gull, then
director of the Utah Securities Commission concerning
the taking of the title to the Wyoming ranch property
in the nan1~ of Beckstead, individually. Something was
said to this effect by Gull. It is funny that no complaining stockholder was produced at the trial, and that the
Court was required to rely entirely upon the loquacious
testimony .of. ~his vigorous public servant.
With respect to the Densley-B,eckstead sheep trans~ction, the evidence cle:arly supports the proposition that
these sheep became a part of the assets of the Beckstead
Livesto-ck C.ompany, that no claim ~ras ever asserted
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to them by Beckstead; tha.t he never ap·propriated any
of the income t{)r any of the sheep, for that matter; to
his O\Yn use or benefit.
Here ag-ain \Ve run into an after thought of counsel.
Xothing \vith respect to this n1atter is found in the pleadings. There is no findings of fact in regard thereto and
the decree does not in any way mention these sheep.
They are not an issue in the case and have no relevancy
of any kind.
BEcKSTEAD LIVESTOCK CoMPANY

It is interesting to note that respondents are not
clear a.s to whether or not they want all of the stock
of this corporation to be owned by the United Bond
and Finance Corporation, or whether it would be better
for a lesser amount to be owned by it. Of one thing there
can be no question, and that is that the United Bond
and Finance Corp·oration owns the Beckstead Livestock
Company, lock, stock and barrel.
THE WILSONS-A TYPICAL CASE
NuMERous SuiTs PENDING
SwiNDLE OF SToCKHOLDERs

"'~ e

shall make our reply to these three subheads
without separation.
The main prop supporting respondent's c~se wa.s the
testim1ony of 0. P. Pearce. Among other things Pearce
admitted that he made false statements to the people
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he .contacted, admitted his conviction of felony, admitted
his own personal interest in the transactions. No effort
has ever been made by appellants to excuse or justify
these acts. \~V e have pointed ·out that the corporation
has in good faith made every effort to rectify these
wrongs and to restore to every stockholder or' former
stockholder, contacted by Pierce the stock procured by
him.
Neither the

Wils~ons

nor any other former stock-

holder mentioned under these sub-titles of respondents'
brief are plaintiffs in this action. A valiant attempt was
made by respondents to bolster up whatever case they
had by espousing the cause of these people. It appears
that the \\Tilsons, the Hofmans, the Jacksons, Dr. Petty
and others had been at one time stockholders of the
United Bond and Finance Corporation.

Most of then1

many years ago traded all or part of their United Bond
and Finance Corporation stock for Investors Thrift stock.
In 1935 they tra.ded their Investors Thrift stock ·and
whatever stock in the United B·ond and Finance Corporation they then posse'ssed for stock in the American
Keene Plaster & Cernent Company.
In November of 1938 these stockholders connnenced
suits in the Third Judicial Di,strict Court in and for the
County of Salt Lake against W. R. Beckstead, Willian1
L. Christensen, Boyd Evans and the United Bond and
Finance Corporation, .said actions being No. 62150 and

62151. '
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In 62150 John ~1. ''7 ilson and l\fayme Wilson were
plaintiffs. In their ·complaint they set forth nine different causes of aetion. The first cause \Yas for rescission
and restoration of their stock in the United Bond and
Finance Corporati~on. The second cause seeking similar
relief \Yas broug-ht as assig-nee for Pearl L. Jackson of
Randolph, Utah. The third cause, seeking similar relief
was brought as assig-nee of Pauline and Henry Hofman.
The fourth cause, seeking· similar relief was brought as
assignee of Raymond Hofman and Lillian A. Hofman.
The fifth cause, seeking similar relief was brought as
a-ssignee of F. H. Petty ·of Cedar City, Utah. The sixth
cause, seeking similar relief was brought as assignee of
D. H. Hyatt and LaVerna Hyatt of Parowan, Utah-. The
seventh cause, seeking sin1ila.r relief was brought as
assignee of lVIelbourne DeMille and Jennie DeMille. The
eighth cause, seeking similar relief was brought as assignee of Nellie and Orravell Kapple of Payson, Utah.
The ninth cause, seeking similar relief was brought as
assignee of John R. Robinson of Paragonah, Utah.
In case 62151 the plaintiff is Margaret Thurman.
Her con1plaint contains t\YO causes of action.

The first

seeks rescission_ and restoration of plaintiff's stock in
the United Bond and Finance Corporation. The second
seeking the same relief, \vas brought a.s assignee of Ida
R. Thurman of Lehi, Utah.
In our .original brief, at page 155 et cetera, we stated
that for several years an offer of rescission previously
made had remained open to all of thes·e people, and
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that ,said offer of :rescission was renewed in good faith.
Our brief· was filed in this court on the 27th day of
August, 1941.
The attorneys for plaintiff in suits Nos. 62150 and
62151 'are Irvine, .Skeen and Thurman. They likewise
are attorneys for respondents here.
Respondents' brief was filed in this Court on the
27th day of November, 1941. The records and files in
the County Clerk's office ,of Salt Lake County, show
that on the 6th day of Octo her, 1941, upon motion of
attorneys· for the plaintiffs, that is to ·say, upon n1otion
of Irvine, Skeen and Thurman, it was ordered by the
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich, one of the Judges of the
said C·ourt, that the said actions, C'ase Nos. 6'2150-62151,
be, and they were thereby, dismissed with prejudice,
at plaintiffs' costs.
\\T e would not mention these matters herein, being

conscious of the rule that limits the consideration of
matters on appeal to matters appearing .from the record
if it were not for the fact that a representation has been
made here to the effect that the Wilsons, the Hofmans,
the Jacksons, the Thurmans, Frank Petty, and many
others, are no"r seeking relief in the Courts, and that
numerous suits are now pending, when as a matter of
fact 'at the very time the brief was filed, attorneys, who
\vere co-authors of the brief, well knew that these suits
had been dismissed with prejudice and at plaintiffs'
costs upon their own motion, and that the res·cissions so
repeatedly ·offered by the app·ellants herein had been ac-
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oopted, and that all these people upon whose :shoulders·
respondents haYe s-ought to stand had been·. restored to
their status as stockholder·s in the United Bond and
Finance Corporation.
\\""" e say to the Court now, as we have said in our
main brief, that over a period of years everything has
been done that could be done by the .corporation to
restore to these peo·ple, contacted by Pearce, their f·ormer
status as stockholders. \V-hatever wrongs that have been
done have been righted, and no, receivership has ever
been or is no\v needed to accomplish this purpo~e.
For the information of the Court while \Ve are on
the subject of "numerous suits pending'', we say that
there is ·only one suit p·ending against the United Bond
and Finance Corporation in addition to this receivership
action, and that is a suit by a former stockholder seeking s-ome relief either damages or rescission, the exact
nature of which cannot be determined from the pleadings. We have demurred to the complaint, the demurrer
has stood unchallenged for almost eighteen months.
Upon authority of our clients we now say that if the
plaintiff therein will restore to the corporation the con,sideration received by her for stock sold, together with
a reasonable rate ·of interest, she may be restored to her
original status as a stockholder in the corporation.
It may be pertinent to remark that all of these
people and their ·counsel are evidently willing to do
business with the defendant corporation and have suffi-
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·cient confidence in its management to accept stock therein
in full and complete settlement of their claims.
STOCKHOLDERS ARE WITHOUT REMEDY AT LAW.

One of the most remarkable arguments which we
have ever read is respondents' argument under this
heading,

starti~g

at page 50 of their brief. In order to

conclusively show and demonstrate that the plaintiffs
are without a speedy and adequate remedy at law they
say that various public officials and pri¥ate :attorneys
were consulted, and that one of. these public officials,
Ezra Gull, assigned the witness Rich to investigate the
United B;ond and Finance Corporation, and that because
the accomplishments of these officials and attorneys
were unsatisfactory to respondents, the pr·oposition that
they are ~rithout ren1edy at law is therefore conclusively
established. In other words, respondents contend that
because Gull "\Vas not able to require the hoard
of dire·ctors of the United Bond and Finance
CorptO·ration to do certain things which admittedly
were ''none of Gull's bu.sines~s'' and because neither
the United ,States District Attorney nor the United
States Postal Inspector would or could procure an indictment against the officials of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation, and because the County Attor:Q.ey
of .Salt Lake County would not undertake to force by
criminal proceedings the manager of the corporation to
permit an inspection of the books and reeords ,of the
corporation by a person who had no legal or lawful right
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to inspect said books~ and because attorney Horace ,J.
I~no,vlton a11d the la\Y firm ·of IrYine, Skeen and Thurman \Yere eYidently unable to proeure for their clients
relief satisfaetory to respodents, it therefore follows as
a matter of la\Y that the stoekholders are \Yithout ren1edy
at law.
..~..\s

far as any sho,ving made in this case is concerned

it does not appear that the plaintiffs haiVe ever been
interestecl in any remedy at law \Vhatsoever. Their sole
interest from the outset has been receivership.

They

haYe entirelr failed, as pointed ·out in our original brief,
to either allege or prove their right to any primary
remedy \YhatsoeYer, to which receivership -c-ould he ancillary, and no effort \vhatsoever has been made 1n respondents' brief to meet this argument.
R,espondents are appalled at the idea of appellants
appealing to this Court to set aside a decree of a Court
of equity. It is our understanding that there is no
Inore sanctity or sacredness in a decree of a Court of
equity than in a judgment of a Court of law. B·oth are
subject to review, both are subject to reversal if cause
sufficient appears from the record.
After ~disposing of the facts in the case respondents
proceed with their argument. The sufficien·cy of the
evidence is discussed in about one page and is supported
by quotations from the "Prisoner of Chillon'' and from
"Pope's Essay on Man," eiVidently the sturdiest authorities available to responden:ts.
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. ,We assume from the lack of any argument whatso ..

ever on the sufficiency o( the evidence, that none has
occurred· to counsel's mind.

Following the argument

on the sufficiency:
of. evidence, respondents address them,
selves to a discussion ,of the sufficiency of the pleadings.
The pleadings themselves are not discussed.

A few

authorities are quoted which standing alone perhaps
eontain a correet and accurate statement of the law as
pertaining to the facts of the particular case. "\\Te say
that none ·of these cases support the proposition that a
trial. :Court ·Can properly make findings and deeree on
issues which are not raised by the pleadings. We have
pointed out in our original brief numerous issues determined by the Court which· were not raised by the
pleadings~

w.e pointed out in our original brief the
many instances wherein issues were raised by the pleadings, but not determined. The authorities cited by
respondents under the argument ",sufficiency of pleadings'' do not meet these situations, but eontain mere
general statements of law which are not in dispute in
this case.

Attention of the Court is called to the case of
People's Bonded Tru.stee v. White, 72 Utah 587, 272 Pac.
200, cited. at page 5.5 of respondents' brief. In that
case it was ·contended on appeal that the appointment
of a receiver wa.s null and void be-cause "' 2. The s·upplemental complaint ~do·es not state facts sufficient to invoke
the jurisdi·ction of a Court in making said ordeT. ''
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Addressing itself to that proposition the Court used
the lang11age rontained in the quotations from said case
found in respondents' brief.

The matters which we

have raised in our original brief with respect to the
sufficiency of the complaint do not relate to the question.
of the sufficiency of the complaint to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court but are addressed to the question
as to the sufficiency of the complaint with respect to
issues deternrined by the Court, and the sufficiency of
the complaint with respect to the relief granted by the
court; the sufficiency of the complaint with regard to the
accounting ordered by the Court.
The arguments that we have made on these matters
have been ignored by respondent, and the authorities
cited by him have no relevancy whatsoever in· the de-.
termination .of those issues.
\\'ithin the time alloV\red by law the appellants demurred to respondents' original complaint on the ground
that said complaint did not state facts sufficient to eon.sti tu te a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled,
and thereafter appellants made answer. It has never
been appellant's positio·n that respondents' complaint
was not sufficient to invoke the jurisdi.ction of the
Court. It has, however, been, and still is, appellants'
position that the complaint was wholly insufficient to
support the findings and the decree and the judgment
of the Court as made at the conclusion ·Of the trial, and
fron1 which this appeal has been prosecuted.
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R·iant A1nuse1nent Company v. Bailey, 80 Col. 65,
249 Pac. 7 is cited by respondents at page 56 of their
brief.
In that ease a trustee in bankruptcy of the United
Coaleries Con1pany, bankrupt, brought a suit and had a
decree against plaintiff in error that the latter owed
the bankrupt estate $40,000 which was in equity a lien
on the deqtor '.s property, and ordered the property
sold to satisfy the lien. The basis of the action was the
charge that one, vValker, who controlled both companies,
had fraudulently diverted the funds of the Coaleries
C~ompany to promote and establish the amusen1ent conlpany. After the case \Yas appealed the District Court
appointed a receiver pending the proceedings on error.
The An1usement Con1pany brought error and asked for
a supersedeas on the receiver matter.
There is no sin1ilarity ·either on the facts, the pleadings, the findings, nor the assignments of error, to the
case at bar.
The Court held, first, that the trial Court bad jurisdicti~on to do all the things which it did, and that in the
appointment of a receiver there was no abuse of discretion, that the evidence was sufficient to support the
judg1nent. A reading of the facts in the case clearly
~shows that it does not lend support to any proposition
contrary to appellant's position herein.
In Ellis v. Panther Oil and Gas Company, 171 Old.
552, 42 P. (2d) 423 ·Cited by respondent, the defendant
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appealed fron1 an order, refusing to vacate the appointment of a temporary receiver of certain property owned
by defendant. The only matters presented by the ·appeal
w·ere: 1. That the plaintiff's petition vvas insufficient to authorize the appoint1nent of a receiver; 2. Error in not
holding that plaintiff \vas a con1mon creditor and defendant "~as the trustee for certain preferred creditors. It
readily appears that a determination of either of these
matters could not affect any issue ~or assignment of error
presented on this appeal. Appellants here have not argued
that the petition was insufficient to authorize the .appointment of a receiver. '': e have seriously contended that
the petition does not sup·po·rt either the findings or decree, and that vital issues presented by the pleadings
were not determined by the Court but the sufficiency of
the complaint, independent of these c-onsiderations, has
not been argued.
The case of Bryan v. Welch, 74 F. (2d) 964, involved
proceedings under Section 77 B of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, and the Court had before it the question as
to whether or not a receivership of a trust in the State
Court \Yas an equity receivership within the meaning
of said Section 77 B. The Court held that there was sueh
a receivership. Wherein this case iri any way supports
respondents' contention we are at a loss to understand.
It is .cited under the subhead ''Sufficiency of Pleadings.''
Apparently counsel is talking about the contention of the
appellants that the decree and findings of fact are not
supported by the pleadings. N·o such problem is dis-
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cussed or mentioned in the cited case, and the holding
is limited entirely to questions involving ~said ·Section
of the bankruptcy act .
. An examination of the case's merely cited on page 58
of respondents' brief will .show t hat they a~e of no assistance whats·oever in determining the questions presented here.
1

Respondents' argument under the sub-title "Conduct
of Trial Court'' hegins at page 59 of their brief. In
characteristic fashion, respondents refer to appellants
argument as being purely techincal .and without substance of fact or law. If there be no substance in the
rule that requires a judgment and decree to be .supported
by the findings and by. the pleadings, then perhaps there
is no substance to our argument. If there is no ~sub
stance to the rule that requires trial Courts to make
:findings 01~ the rna terial issues pres en ted by the pleadings, then perhaps there is no substance to our argument. If th·ere is no substance to the rule th.at requires
findings and decree to be supported by the evidence then
there is no substance to our argwnent. If there be no
substance to the rule that requires plaintiff, seeking a
receiver, to plead and p:vove his right to a priinary
remedy to which receivership can be .ancillary, then
perhaps there is no .substance to our .argument.
These fundamental and element1ary propositions are
not discussed in respondent's brief. Respondents have
not ·cited one single authority which casts any doubt
upon the propositi,ons argued by appellants, and we
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assun1e from lack of answer, either that respondents
are unable to n1ake reply, or that they have failed ·to
appreciate their significance.
It is suggested that appellants were fearful of
''facing the facts at the trial.''

We ,say in answer to

this eharge, that we have newer had any fear of facing
facts as distinguished from unsupported insinuations,
assun1ptions and suspicions. We have, of course, ohj.ected to the proof of matter not even remotely suggested
by the ·complaint. \\T e have objected to the findings of
the Court on· issues not raised by the pleadings, and ·we
have objected to a decree \\"'~hich require-s defendants
to account for transactions which are not ma.de material by any pleadings whatsoever. If these he technicalities, then we say these technicalities are of great
importance and great value n·ot ~only to the Court. hut
to litigants in saving them from the necessity of defending against ·Charges unplead, and ~of which they have no
knowledge whatsoever until the testimony is offeJred at
the trial. In spite .of the valiant effort -of respondents
to connect various witnesses and people with plaintiffs' ease we ,still insist that appellants were not granted
a fair and impartial trial.
"\V.e are rather amused atl respondents' argument,
commencing on page 67 under the· title ''A. W. Madsen
Connected Up.'' With whom he has been "connected up"
does not appear either from the record nor from th·e
brief. He was called as a witness by the respondents.
It definitely appeared that he never had any connection
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whatsoever with any of the appellants, and that they
were not involved in .any way a~s far as Madsen was concerned with the acquirement -of the Pogliano stock.
The exan1ina.tion and cross examination of 0. P.
Pearce will no doubt be considered by the Court. In
rnany respects the testim~ny of Pearce and Beckstead
conflict. The Court must determine which of these witnesses is more worthy of belief, Pearce, the convicted
felon, and adn1itted prevaricator or Beckstead a business
man, who by his ability and good management has been
solely responsible for the success .of the defendant corporation.
Respondent's version of the trial Court's act
1n impounding the assets is presented -conrmencing at
page 87 of their brief. N·o reason is shown justifying·
the Court's action in this respect, and nn argument is
made to the effect that said action was justified by any
showing made at the time ·or prior thereto, nor was there
a showing of any danger whatsoever -of loss of this fund.
THE LAW

CoRPORATION MAY NoT

BuY

ITs OwN STOCK

Respondents' argument on this proposition consists
of a citation ·of one provision of the Constitution of
Utah, and several sections of the Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, and the Utah ·Case of Pace v. Pace Brothers
Oompany, 91 Utah 132.
The interesting thing to note about this argument
is that counsel cites no authority and makes no arguSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47

ment to the effect that a purchas-e by a corporation of
its own stock is grounds for a receivership or that .such
act~Yity an1ounts to misn1anagement.

''l1en the Court takes into consideration the facts
and circumstances surrounding the purchase of thi~s .stock
we believe it will be convinced that there was no mismanagement in these purchases, but on the contrary, a
prudent exercise of judgment in the management of the
affairs of this ·corporation. Through the purchas.e of
stock the remaining· stockholders including the re,spondents have been benefitted. Their stock and the corporati,on itself are worth more than they otherwise would
have been.
A comparison of the facts presented in the Pace case
with the facts presented here, viewed in connection with
certain statements made by the Court in the Pace case,
casts serious doubt on the proposition that the decision
in the Pace .case makes unlawful the action of the corpoTation in the purchase ·of its own ~stock as disclosed
by the record here.
In the Pace case the corporation purchased a large
amount of its outstanding stock from a member of a
family .c.orporat~on, giving in payment ·certain promissory notes secured by mortgages on,.~ll ·of its property.
Unsecured creditors intervened in the action to foreclose
these mortgages, claiming that the corporation had no
power to purchase its own stock under the circumstances
as dis-closed by the record. It appeared that the unsecured creditors would lose their claims unless the note
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·and mortgage: trahisactiorts were set aside. Judgment
went against the interveners and they appealed on the
ground that . the property mortgaged to Sidney Pace
.should he .appli{fable to the payment of their claims and
.those of oth~r. unsecured creditor.s, on the ground that
th~ mortgages. were not, valid for the. reason defendant
"corporation had no power to buy its own stock. Amicus
Curiae too~ the opposite position. The Court after
stating the ~a.~ts made the following significant statement:
''We ·consider tJhe question as to whether the
defendant corporation under the circumstances
in whic;h. this purchase was made had authority
to buy its own stock held by Sidney Pace. Our
dccisio:n on that question will be limited strictly
to the facts of this cal8e. ''
·
The Court reached the conclusion that under the
facts of that ease Pace Brothers C·ompany could not buy
in its own .stock and thereby defeat the claims of un. secured creditors. A reading .of the decision will .show
that the c·ourt left open for future decision a determin:ation of the .instances wherein a corporation may law.fully buy in its ·own .stock.
In the ·ca,se at bar the stock of the corporation was
bought in to protect the corporation, to reduce its liabilities;· and; to increase its ,surplus, and these lawful
purposes were: accomplished. In this case the action is
not brought by one who has suffered loss· or detriment,
but i,s hroug:P.t by. those who have benefited and profited
by these ~e:ry irans·action~. No. creditor secured or unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49
seeured \Yas in any particular damaged or injure« :by
the purchases complained of.
....-\.gain \Ye call the Court's attention to the fact that
while respondents haYe neYer indicated whether ·th:ey
intend to ac.cept or reject the benefits which have accru·ed
to them as a result of these transactions they seek· to :lise
the holding Inade in the Pace case to bolster their
position here. This to us presents a classic example of
attempting to "'eat their cake and keep it at the same
time."
~liS~IA:NAGEMENT.

The appellants in this case have never taken the
position that mismanagen1ent, as defined by the authorities, is not a ground for receivership. The law is that
a reeeiver may be app·ointed as ancillary to some other
rem·edy, such as accounting \vhen there has been mismanagement of a certain character. To justify the .appointment of the re·ceiver, respondents' must show. a
right to an accounting, plus mismanagement. The very
quotations which are found in respondents' brief under
this subdivision show very clearly that they have the
burden of showing mismanagement. In this Gas·e, they
have produced no substantial evidence ·of any mismanagement.
From a quotation in Tardy's Smith on Rece,ivers,
1920 Edition, Volum·e 1, Page 723, respondents italicize
the following:
''A majority of the stockholders· of· a eorporati·on, no matter how large, has no right to: divert
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to then1selves assets of the company to the detriment of its creditors and stockholders.''.
C~ounsel

are merely using words, and abstractly at
that, when they quote such language. They did not
introduce any evidence at the trial of the case that any
a.sset·s \Vere diverted by majority stockholders. They
could not point out at the trial of this case wherein any
as-sets had been diverted. They do not point out in their
briefs on appeal where any assets have been diverted,
and the simple question, "What assets have been diverted~'' has never he en answered ~nr attempted to be
answered by respondents.
Again in t:he quotation from High on Receivers, 4th
Edition, Section 295 B, the italicized portion refers to
''fraudulently and wrongfully misappropriating the corporate property, and it therefore profited.''
Wherein dn such quotations have any n1ateriality
here, unless counsel thinks that hy a .continual repetition
of such words they n1ay finally, Goebhel like, make this
Court believe that those oft-repeated phrases wre true.
Respondents italicize the following from 16 Fletchers on Corporations, 165:
'' \-Vhere they are trying to freeze out the
minority, or \vhere the mismanagement is evidenced by or accompanied with conversion, n1isa.ppropria tion or division of c-orporate funds by
such officers.''
Here again they attempt to make in1pres.sive use of
words which have no application t'O the case at bar. By
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purchasing the ~tot'k "·bich \ra~ purchased predomin'antly
~n the yt>ars 1934 and 1~1~33, "·herein \vere the present
plaintiffs frozen out ? The onl~· persons who \Vere frozen
out. if such tt>rn1 can be so used, \vere the individuals
\vho sold their stock to stockbrokers and other individuals. TI1ey are not ~on1plaining in this la-\v suit, and are
not represented h-ere.
The a11thorities cited by respondents are not helpful,
and in the main haYe no bearing on the questions pre.sented here for the consideration and deter1nination of
the court.

In Ponca Jlill Glonz.pany v. ~fikesell, 55 Neb. 98,
75 N. ,,~. 46, cited at page 100 of respondents' brief, the
defendants demurred to a eo·mplaint seeking, among
other things, receivership of a corporation. The demurrer was overruled, defendants refused to plead, a
receiver \Yas appointed, and from the order of the Court
overuling the de1nurrer and the appointment of a receiver, the defendant appealed. The appellate Court
held that the eomplaint \vas sufficient.
A comparison of the facts alleged in that complaint
with the facts alleged and proved in this case will show
they have no similarity. This opinion does not cast any
doubt whatsoever upon any of the fundamental matters
presented and argued by appellants. Not one single
matter relied upon by app·ellants for a reversal -of the
judgment of the trial Court here was determined or
considered by the Court in the case cited.
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The :case

of Brent v·. B·. E. Brister Sawmlill Com-

pany, 103 Miss. 876, 60 S'o. 1018, cited at page 101 of
re.spondent~'

brief, was an appeal from an order appoint-

ii):g a receiver.

With the pTopositions of law stated

in that .opinion, we do not disagree. In the discussion of
~ase. by

the.

respondents many statements are italicized.

:Fo:r what reason we are not aware.

These italicized
stfltements d<;> not. pertain to legal issues concerning
vvhich the parties hereto are in -conflict. For instance,
by italics the attention of the Court is directly called to
th~' pr.6position that where the majority of stockholders
pursue operations which must eventually be ruinous or
should the enterprise he abandoned as impossible of
realization, any shareholder ,v.ould upon plain and equitable principles, be entitled to the assistance of a Court
of :equity. This proposition is not in dispute. But in
the case ·at bar there are no findings, nor was there any
proof to make this principle of law applicable. It is
simp1y.imma.terial. Again it is stated:
""\Vhen it shall appear that by gross mismanagement of the affairs and 1nisapplicati·on of
the property or funds of a -corporation by the
directors or other officers in control, the rights
Qf the stockholders, as well a.s the creditors, are
put in jeopardy * * * the c.ourt 111ay appoint
a re·Ceiverr to take charge of the busineS·S of the
corporation.''
This matter is not disputed and is not material nor
'
applicable to a· determination of the issues presented,
for the simple reason that there is no finding nor proof
.'

'

.

.
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of. misn1anagement as a result whereof the rights of the
stockholders are being put in jeopardy.
The facts of that case and the facts of this case have
no similarity \Yhatsoever. In that case it app·eared, without doubt, that one corporation was being opera.ted at a
great loss and perhaps inefficiently for the direct benefit
of another corporation in

"~hich

several of the principal

stockholders of the defendant corporation vvere interested. There is no such situation in the case at bar.
Here again we have a case quoted fro:m .at lengtp
which casts no doubt whatsoever upon any ·Of the

funda~.

mental propositions relied upon by appellants for reversal of the decision of the trial Court.
Respondents quote 'the entire opinion of Hechler
v. Emery, 226 N. Y. S. 599. It is imp·ossible to tell from
that opinion "~hat the ease is about. It in no plac.e
appears for what -or whom the receiver is to be ap.pointed, nor does it appear upon what grounds the same
is sought.
T;his case subsequently can1e before the Court. From
the opinion found a.t 234 N. Y. S. 46, it appea.rsthat the
plaintiff sought to have a receiver appointed for the stock
held and ·Claimed by the defendant Emery. This is not
the situation which is before the Court, here. · From a
reading of the two opinions, it clearly appears that the
decision is not in point, and is not determinative of an~
of the issues here pTesented.
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Kennedy Drug Compa;ny v. Keyes, 60 Washington
337, 111 Pac. 175,.is -clearly distinguishable from the case
at bar. In the first place, a distinct issue wa.s made as to
the ownership of the corporate stock, as well as the
issue of ·consideration paid therefor.

The brief of appellants, page 81, clearly indicates
tha.t never was any such issue raised by the pleadings
in the ,case at bar.
Another distinct factor is that there were pleadings,
pr.oof and findings that the defendants' management
threatened the corporation with insolvency.
thing exist·s here.

No such

It also appeared that the de-

fendant, as manager, had contracted heavy obligations
by causing the corporation to borrow money at a high
rate of interest, and this is referred to as irregular
·Conduct. ,Such conduct is not present in the case at
bar. It is further found that the entire- transaction in
the Kennedy Drug Company case was sho,vn to be fraudulent fron1 its ·commencen1ent. That plaintiff "\Vas effectually defrauded of his property. There is no pleading,
proof or finding in the case at bar of any such transaction. Many fraudulent representations and much fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendant in that case
was . shown by the evidenc.e. A readin~ of that case
wip sho'v that it is not in any way helpful to the respo~ents herein.
··' Respondents cite the case of Cantw·ell, et ft·l. v. Col.
Lead ·Co., CMo.) 97 S. ,V. 167. The case is ·not·discussed,
1
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but a portion of the opinion of the Court
'vithout c-omn1ent.

IS

set forth

The Cant"'"ell ease "'"as another case where the Court
considered merely the allegations of the complaint, and
held that the alleg-ations \vere sufficient to ju·stify the
Court in appointing· a receiver. The facts have no
similarity ,,,.hatsoever to the facts in the case at bar.
X ot one sing-le proposition presented by the appellants
and relied upon by them for reversal of the judgn1ent
herein, \Yas discussed, let alone decided, by the Missouri
Court in the Cantwell case.
The italicized language in the quotation found at
pages 110-111 of the brief, is another instance of irrelevant statements concerning which there is no dispute.
There are no findings, there is no· evidence here that
the United Bond and Finance Corporation has been,
or is being wrecked for purely, selfish and illegal purposes, n~r that minority interests are frozen out; that
business immorality ha~s run amu·ck, or that by fraud,
conspiracy or covinous conduct or extreme mismanagement, the rights of minority stockholders have be~n
put in imminent peril, and that the underly~ng original
corporate entity ·cordiale has been unfairly destroyed..
These matters when prnved are generally held to
be sufficient to authorize and justify the Court in appointing a receiver, but in the case at bar there are no findings
and no proof of their existence.
The case of Morse v. Metropolitan 8. S. Co., et al.,
87 N. J. Eq. 219, 100 Atl. 219, is cited but for \Vhat pur-
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pose· i.s. ·Certainly ;not. apparent to .the writers. of this
hri·ef.: Jt is. -h~rd to conceive of cases as entirely different as. ,Jhe ;Mors.e case and the case at b.ar. The Morse
case, involved an action for receiver·ship of a corpo\..
ration ·,wh~ch had no property whatsoever in the State
of New, Jersey; a corporation whose p·roperty had been
removed from New Jersey to Califiornia, and which had
not, over a period of years, earried on any business
whatsoe-ver in the State of New Jersey. There were no
findings which in any way resembled the findings herein.
The appeal did not determine or attempt to determine
any issue which has been presented by the records in
this case. It does not in any way support any position
contrary to the position ·Of the app·ellants in this ca.se.
:In the case of ·Sant .v. Perreville .Shingle Company,
179 Mich. 42, 146 N. W. 212, it appeared that the majority stockholders had appropriated all of the · property
of t~at eompany, and that the c,ompany had -ceas·ed to
operate and was virtually dead. The receivership there
was for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the
corporation-a far-cry from the situation in the case at
bar. It appeared that the largest stockholder had appropriated all of the property of the eorp·oration, and
it ~as found that he was indebted to the said company
in the sum of $10,884.26, and that that indebtedness constituted the sole as·s.ets of the company. A recitation of
these facts. shows how utterly irrelevant and immat·erial
thl.s.·case is .
.

.

.

I

.The :first· paragraph quoted by the respondent is
language used by the: Court in supporting the claim of
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the attorney for the c-o1nplainants in the,·Sa.nt case. The
second paragraph relates to the same subject, and the .
Court goes on to say that it seems just ·and equitable··
that the corporation should pay the reasonable expenses
of bringing into its treasury funds which would not have··
been recovered "ithout the efforts and litigation instituted by the complainants. Based upon this reasoning·
the Court allowed the claim ·of the complainants' attorney. ''nat has this to do with the case at bar~·

Col. 1\. .at. Sand Dredging Company v. liVashed Bar
Sand Dredging Company, 136 F. 710, cited at page

11~

of re.spnndents' brief, is an opinion ·Of the Penn·sylvania
Federal District Circuit Court, and involved. a suit for
receivership by minority stockholders.

It appeared

from the complaint and from the facts that ·the managing officers of the defendant corporation were the office:r;s
and owners of another corporation, and that the affairs
of the defendant corporation were managed at a loss to
it and for the benefit and profit of the other corporation.
It also appeared that stock in the defendant corporation,
which had been bought by the managing corporate officers
had not been paid for,. and that the money.a.dvanced'by:
these officers for the building of certain machines, which
mon~ys they agreed to advance in paym-ent for the stock;
had been charged as a loan against the ·defendant com~.
pany in favor of the other corporation· o~e~ by th.e~s~.
officers~ This case has no similarity to the case at·· bar;
no issue is determined, or· discussed in ·the opinion of
that ease which has been presented by this appeal.
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The quotation italicized, set £,orth on page 113 of the
brief, shows this dissimilarity. The basis of that decision seems to be the finding ''that the baard of dire:etors V\rho are responsible for the mismanagement are
the majority stockholders, and that they are 1nanaging
the corporation f.or their OV\'ll benefit· and diverting its
funds and income to themselves.'' There are no such
findings here.
The case of Bankers J.fortgage Cornpany v. Rttpp,

(·C. C. A. 10) 6·6 F·ed. ('2d) 99·2, cited at page 115 of respondents' brief does not involve, nor did the Circuit
C·ourt deterinine any single issue presented by the appeal
in this case.

The quoted portions o.f the opinion refer

to the ''Tell recognized do·ctrine that a c.ourt of chancer~:"
may intervene and appoint a receiver under certain circumstanc.es. If it is true that the la.w announced by an
appellate Court 1nust be considered and ·construed in
light of the facts and factual issues "\vhich make the principles of la"r pertinent, then \Ve say that the opinion
has no relevancy or pertinency to the facts and issues
presented on this appeal. That case arose on an
application to the Circuit Court to stay the receivership pending final determination of the case
on its merits.
The Court specifically points out
that the evidence was not before it, and that they,
·of necessity, must take the findings of facts as con·clusive. It appears that the managing directors had
been purchasing savings bonds of the corporation from
their holders at a ·sn1all part of their ca.sh surrender
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value, and then delivering them to the corporation at
their full eash surrender value.

It wa.s further found

that if the n1anag-in·g <,lirector8 were permitted to pa.rticipate in the management of the eompany, they would
continue such ·conduct. It also appeared tha:t the managing directors "~ere indebted to the corporation in a su1n
exceeding· $100,000.00, and that because of the management the co1npany had had prolonged difficulty
"'~ith the Blue Sky Departments in the several states
where the company operated. The statement indicates
how far fron1 the ease at bar this Rupp case is. Had
Bec~stead purchased the stoc:k personally from the holders thereof at a very small or nominal figure, and then
sold it to the corporation for its par value, we would
have an an·alagous situation. Such, h·ovvever, is not the
case here, and hence this opinion can be of no assistance
in the determination of the matters raised by the appellants on this appeal.
The case of Bo!othe v. Su:mmitt Gold Mining Com-pany, 5·5 '':rash. 167, 10:! Pac. 207, cited at page 116 of re-

spondents' brief,

\Yas

a case vvhere the capital stock vvas

evenly divided, and where there was a irreconc~ilable conflict, .and vvhere those having the control did not own nor
repre·sent a majority of the stock. The Court followed
rules re·cognized gener•ally and not in dispute. The decision is based squarely on the propositi~on that every
corporation is to be controlled by a board representing a
majority of the voting stock, and that no majority controlled the corporation there.
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Seven .cases are cited .on pages 117-118 of respondents' brief. 1;hose. eas-es are even further away than
the cases from which he makes quotations. They merit
no more consideration by the c·ourt than given by the
authors o£ :respondents' brief.

;1

~Commertcirig

at page 118 of re·spondents' brief, the
proposition tba t ''Insolvency Need Not Be Shown'' is
argued .. ¥any authorities, no doubt, support that statement of law. However, these authorities do not support
the proposition that insolvency is not an important factor in the vast majority of .cases where the appointment
of a. receiver has been sustained on appeal. The faci
that a corporation is solvent and a going concern certainly is strong evidence that there has been no misJnana.gement of its affairs.
An examination of the eases where ·Courts have
held that insolvency need not be shown in the greatmajority .of instances, will show that there was a present
danger of loss or wrongful diversion of corporate assets
and also 'fraud and dishonesty in the management.
In the case at bar the plaintiffs charged systematic,
·habitual and long continued wrongful diversion and
misappropriation of ·corporate assets, and that as a result
of these a·ctivities the .eorporration was either insolvent
or in imminent danger of· insolvency, but their proof
failed to support either the allegations of wrongful misappr-opriation or insolvency. It appeared on the other
band· that the corporation is solvent and has a large
r.es-erve.
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It 'vas and is, appellants' contention ~that the· failure
of the plaintiff to prove the "~rongful diversion and systematic· and· fraudulent misappropriation of .corpor~te
assets, when considered "~ th the proof of the ·solvency
of the corporation, required a. finding that there~ ~had
been no m.i,smanagement and therefore judgment for th.e
defendant.
We believe that a -consideration of every case cited
by the respondents under this subdivision of their: ·brief
will show either uncontradicted allegations or findings
of positiYe fraud, willful misappropriation, and diversion
of corporate assets, "~hich has resulted in a present wellfounded danger of insolvency .
.SYSTEMATIC AND HABITUAL EVIL PRACTICES

16 Fletchers on Corporation, page 172, is correctly
quoted by counsel. It is to the effeet that before

a Coti~t

will appoint a receiver for a goin·g and pr·osperous ·COncern which is neither insolvent or in danger of ins-olvency,
the evil practices must be systematic and habitual and
so interwoven as to beeam·e a part of the general bu~i
ness. Plaintiff must prove this before he is ·entitle4 .to
a receiver.
As heretofore indicated, the evidence claimed by
counsel to sh.ow evil practices ends in· the year 1936-:four years previous to the commencement of this ·a;c:tion.
\V herein is there any proof that the pra.ctices complained
of are now systematic or habitual or interwoven tso ras
1
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to becon1e a part of the general busrines'S? We have heretofore pointed out th'at there is no proof of the existence
of any evil practices.
·Eiven if we agree with appellants for the sake of
arg·ument that the practice of the corporation of buying
its 0\\7n S'tock was ''an evil pra:ctiee,'' this practice is not
intervv-oven with the affairs of the corporation, has not
been followed srince 1936, and has no present connection
whatsoever \vith the operation of the corporate affairs.
C·o.mmencing- at page 122, respondents present their
argument on the question of ac-counting.

The most re-

markable thing ahout this argument is that respondents
seem t·o have abandoned entirely the order of accounting as made by the Court. They have made no effort to
support it, and without doubt this order is the cap stone
of respondents' case. Evidently

respond~nts

agree with

appellants that this order of ac;c,ounting cannot be supported.

If there is to be any accounting here, it must

be such accounting as O]}dered by the c~ourt, and that
only. VV. e have contended, and \Ve think OUr -contention
is supported by responsible authorities, that the accounting as ordered is not justified or warranted by the pleadings, proof or findings. Their failure to support the trial
Court's accounting order, fortifies our position that the
one and only. purpose of this suit is receivership and
therefore must fail. F'rom respondents' argument it
seen1s they now 'Nant an accounting on matters not mentioned ~o·r granted in the decree in thi~s case.
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,,~ith

the la\Y as quoted we have no disagreement.
Its appli·cation is the thing· \Ve say ·cannot be made to the
case at bar.
A few of the stateJnents made by counsel are perha:ps
worthy of note.
On pag·e 1~5 is one of the m-ost hum·orous statements,
of course not meant to be so, \vhich we have ever seen
in a brief. Resp~ondents say: ''We presume appellants
will allow plaintiffs a credit for the 1102 head of sheep
sold by Beckstead for $5,300.00 while the trial was 1n
progress, which would reduce the number to 998. ''

In the first place we fail to understand just how or
in what manner plaintiffs are entitle.d to any credit whatsoever on this matter of sheep. In the ·second place, it appears clearly from the record that the sheep sold were
all lambs. Perhaps Counsel is not aware of the fact
that ewes produce lambs.
Also on page 135 it is stated that the mortgage indebtedness against the Wyoming ranches is in exce~ss of
$14,000.00. We challenge respondents to support that
statement by the citation of any evidence whatsoever.
From respondents argument it might appear that
there is some evidence that the hooks and records of the
Beckstead Livestock Company and the United Bond and
Finance Corporation do not accurately show the condition of affairs as they exist between these two corporations. There is no such evidence; there is no such finding, and there has been no showing made in regard .to
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these ·corporate relationships which demands or necessitates the appointment of a receiv~er.
·On page 126 is a statement which is not only rediculous, but ·could find support only in the imagination of
counsel for respondents:
''We venture that such an accounting will
s:h.ow an outstanding unpaid indebtednes·s of the
Beckstead Livestock c·ompany considerably
nearer the sum of $94,000.00 than the figure of
$14,000.00 .stated a.t page 61 of appellants' brief.''
We suggest that the only indebtedness of the Beckstead Livestock Cnmpany which is of any .consequence
whatsoever to thes·e respondents is the indebtedness of
the Livestock C;ompany to persons, firms or corporations
other than the United Bond and Finance Corporation.
As we understand it, it is impossible for a man to owe
anything to himself. Likewise, it would be impossible for
a corporation to owe anything to itself. The Beckstead
Livestock C.ompany is a part of the property and a p3:rt
of the holdin~s of the United Bond and Finance Corporation. Every asset owned by the Beckstead Livestock
Company is owned by the U:q.ited Bond and Finance CorpoTation through its ownership of all of the stock in the
livestock company.
W·e might point out to the Court at this time the
ineonsistency which is present in this phase of respondents' brief. He cites Commerce Tru.st Comp·any v. Woodbury, "77 ~ed. 478, to the effect that a corporation is a
wholly separate entity from its stockholders, and that
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o"·nership of all stock of one corporation hy .another does
not create a merger of the two corporations into a single
entity. He then cites '1'rustee System of Penn v. P·a.yne,
65 Fed. (2d) 103; Cornnz.erce Trust Company v. Woodbury, 77 Fed. (2d) -178 and Texas Company V'. Roos, 9·3
Fed. (2d) 380, to the effect that the entity of interlocking corporations may be disregarded in receivership
n1atters.
\Y.e do not believe any of these cases will help in the

case at bar. Counsel can't escape from the fact that
the Livestock Company is .owned completely by the
Finance Corporation. The audits introduced in evidence and the ·exhibits relating to this subject, indicate
definitely that the records reflect the transaetions hetween the two corporations, which a.re merely a matter
of bookkeeping, and also the property used by the Finance Corporation in obtaining the assets which it now
holds in the name of the Livestock C-ompany.
\\1 e

desire to point out that respondents are supposed to be citing ,cases and ~discussing the accounting
decree ordered by the Court. They have gone afield.
At page 129 of their brief respondents wonder why
Bec~stead was apprehensive about the stock of the company being in the hands of stockbrokers. Beckstead
undoubtedly knew the diffieulties which the .corporation
would likely encounter. These stockholders ha.d not
bought the stock to hold a:S an investment. They had
purchased the stock for only one reason, to make a profi:t
upon its sale, and they would and no doubt did exert
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every effort to force the Finance C·orporation to buy
this stock from them.
We believe tha.t Beckstead was entitled t() use his
good judgm.ent in getting this .stock out of the hands of
these stockbrokers. It is n ot a question o.f handling the
business properly or keeping accura.te books. It is a
question of getting stock out of the hands of those who
do not desire to hold it, but who are d·etermined to sell it.
1

·,t,
J·

'On page. 130 of the hrief r.e,s.pondents claim that
B·eckstead did

some~thing

wrongful in buying up bonds

of the corporation at sixty cents on the dollar.

~::

If, as

a manager of the corporation, he could buy them up at
forty cents on a dollar, it would be his duty to do .so, and
if he didn't, re:spondents would he here showing that
he had an opportunity to reduce the indebtedness of the
corporation for less than its face amount and didn't do
so, and therefore ha·d mismanaged the affairs of the
company to the detriment of its stockholder,s.
We say that as the manager of this corporation it
was his duty to do as it i~s charged he did. As heretofore remarked, how or in what manner or to what extent
was this ·coTporation or these respondents injured .by
the action of the managing officers in retiring the~se
bonds at sixty cents on the dollar. None of the bondholders have ·complained. None of them are before the
Court. There seems to be no legal nor practical support for the heroic po·sition now taken by respondents.
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Respondents have spent n1ore tin1e in arg·uing their
conclusions than they haYe in presenting the argument
on some of the most vital issues in this case. We shall
take notice of a fe\Y of these so-called conclusions.
It is stated as a eonclusion: For every unit of stock
purchased by them these stoekholders ha.ve paid Beckstead a premium for commissions of either $2'5, $30 or

$50 over and above the $100.00 par value of the preferred
stock. This is not a

eonclusi~o-n

based on the evidence, but

one taken from the unsupported imagination of respondents.

The commissions were paid to the stock ,sales-

man. Beckstead received a. commission on the stock he
sold and an over-writing c:ommi.ssion on stock ·sold by
agents working under him. It is true the units sold for

$125.00, $135.00 and $150.00, but the ·Commission was
always twenty per cent and never varied. On units. sold
for $125.00 the commis.sion, including overwriting, was
$25.00, on units sold for $135.00, the ·commission, including overwriting, was $27.00, and on units which .sold
for $150.00, the commission, including overwriting, was
$30.00.
Throughout these conclusions reference is made to
the fact that Beckstead received the.se commissions. The
purpose is apparent, but its accuracy is disproved by
the uncontradicted evidence in this ·case. Arguments in
the form of conclusions are set forth with respect to
Be·ckstead's stockholdings. These have never been disputed. The significant thing is that no attempt has
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been made in this action to cancel them or set them aside,
and no such order has ever been made.
An fnteresting statement in the form of a conclusion
is contained at page 133 : Wha,t will an aecoun ting show
t ha.t Beckstead has done \vith the moneys and ass·ets of
the trust estate~
1

l! ~

No such ac.counting order "ras ever made, and no
such question is

p~resented

of fact in this eas·e. There

by the decree nor the findings
h~as

heen no effort to disprove

appellants' contenti,on that the books of the company
contain a complete and accurate answer to this question,
and no reflection has ever been cast upon their accuracy
or sufficiency. This que,stion shows exactly what respondents desire. They desire a receiver only. They have not
taken the time nor made any effort to gain for themselves the information ~shown on the ~eompany's books,
but suggest that perhap:S a reeeiver could do it for them
at less trouble to themselve,s after hi~s appointment.
The respondents are not interested in the accounting.
What they want is a receiver, and that only.
On page 134 is s-et forth respondents' so-called conclusion with respect to the pur;chase by the corporation
of its own stock. Again they overlook the opportunity
to tell the Court tihejr inten~tions with respe(~t to the
advantages gained for the corporation and for these
respondents by these transaetions. We would still like
to know whether they have ·concluded to '·'.e:a.t their
cake or keep it.''
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Counsel drags in the American Keene Cement and
Plaster Company and the exchange of stock effe·cted bet,Ye-en that company and the Finance Corporation.
The trial C·ourt found nothing wrong in this transaction. It 1nade no finding ''""ith respect to this matter.
It made no order in relation thereto so far as an acc:ounting is coneerned, and \Yhy has couns.el brought it into
the ease on appeal. It supports no pleading.s. It supports no finding. It supports nothing in the decre·e.
On page 135 are set forth certain purported conclusions to the ·effect that Beckstead intended to steal
and wrongfully appropriate the stock R>equired by the
corporation beeause it was allowed to a~ccumulate and
remain uneancelled, but indorsed in blank in the possession of the corporation for a certain length of time.
We submit that there are only two eonclu.sions which
cou~d be made in regard to this practice: 1. That Be-ckstead intended to steal the stock; and 2. That he did not
so intend. The only one of these conclusions which finds
any support in the evidence whatsoever is the conclusion
that he intended to hold it honestly and for the benefit of
the eorporation. Any other .conclusion would do violence
to the evidence. The fact is that he did not appropriate
one share of it. As a matter ·of fact this stock was not
left indorsed in blank, hut immediately upon its acquirement the name of the Finance Corporation wa.s inserted
in the :as~signmen t as the as,signee.
In ·eonnection with the argument set forth as a conclusion ·at the bottom of page 135 of respondents' brief,
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it· is sufficient to say that all of these transactions were
investigated by the Court and no finding was made to
the effect that there had been or that there was, any
wrongful diversion or misappropriation of co~rporate
assets as a result of these transactions, or any of them,
or that the corporation suffered any loss whatsoever by
reason of them.
~It

is concluded by way of argument that there is a
large amount of O'tlheor property which cannot here be
mentioned, and why can it not be ·mentioned~ Certainly
it is not for lack of space. Certainly it is not for lack
of time. It cannot be mentioned because there is no
evidence to support the .statement of other property
whi·ch ap1)arently it is claimed, h'as be.en appropriated.
·:An argument in the form of a conclusion with respe-ct to certain t•ransactions pertaining to the acquirement of the sheep and property in Wyoming are set
forth.
,
. It appears that respondents eonclude from this part
of their argum·ent that B·e·cks~tead intended to ste·al the
D'ens.ley Beckstead sheep and the profits accruing
therefrom ; that he intended to :Steal the land, the
cattle and the other pr1operty now belonging to the
Beckstead Livestock Company. The only other conclusion is that he did not so in tend, and in this instance,
as the one heretofore mentioned, the only conclusion
supported by the evidence is the latter. No sheep, no
cattle, no l'and, n·o other property of the corporation was
wrongfully taken, .stolen or embezzled.
'

,
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It seems to be respondents' position that be·cause
the opportunity for conyersion, embezzlement and larceny existed, the intention to do so therefore existed.
Reasoning on this basis, eYery man, '"'oman and child
intends to commit any and perhaps every crime known
to the la,v.
This reasoning is followed to it.s logical or illogical
conclusion on page 137. Respondents conclude that because the opportunity to steal and embezzle existed
Beckstead was therefore guilty of c.onversion. In arriving at this conclusion, of cour,se, they lose sight -completely of all of the evidence in .the case.
We call the Court's attention to one argumentative
conclusion set forth on p1a.ge 138, as follows : The great
wonder is that the corporation ha.s survived sueh gross
mismanagement as it has.
We a.re wondering just what respondents' definition
of mismanagement is~
Surely the judgment appealed from should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLIINGS, WALLACE
BRIGHAM

E.

&

BLACK,

RoBERTS,

Attorneys for App·ellavnts.
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